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Abstract
During the Ebola Disease outbreak in 2014-2015 in West-Africa about 24 organizations operated laboratories at 40 sites in Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia. 
Representatives of ten organisations which had deployed laboratories to 16 sites across the three countries in West-Africa convened for a two day symposium in Dakar 
(4-5.02.16) to exchange their experiences. This article summarizes points made during the discussion of the laboratory deployment experiences during the epidemic 
touching organisational and procedural issues.
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Introduction
The unprecedented outbreak of Ebola Virus Disease in West-
Africa led to an international response in which all types of existing or 
budding mobile laboratory concepts were deployed into the field. Apart 
from some, of their individual experiences described in the preceding 
papers some experiences were made across the board and here we try 
to summarize the issues encountered and the lessons learned from 
them. We hope that this can help other mobile laboratory concepts to 
revise and optimize their setup and procedures. It is also quite clear 
that umbrella organisations such as WHO GOARN should take note 
of these experiences to consider solutions in preparation of potential 
future mass deployments of mobile laboratories. There already is one 
publication by the government of the United Kingdom on lessons 
learned from the outbreak [1]. Here the emphasis is on experiences 
made by staff working in the mobile laboratories.
The following topics are discussed: infrastructure issues, pre 
analytical supply chain, analytical and clinical aspects of using 
molecular assays, laboratory procedures. Finally we summarize the 
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areas, which need attention after the outbreak has subsided, in a 
pargarph describing the post-epidemic needs.
Infrastructure
Electricity
Most of the laboratories faced instable electricity supply with 
erratic power surges and power cuts. The generators brought by some 
teams to provide their independent energy supply faced a shortage of 
supply of the right type of fuel and had to organize their own supply 
chain. In one case a generator brought by the South African team failed 
and was luckily replaced by the local government. 
Electricity supply can be a major infrastructure issue in poor 
countries. A lack of electricity supply shuts down laboratory operation 
and essential cooling of laboratory spaces. 
Alternative electricity sources used were cars tapped via power 
converters. Pickups are very often at their limit if they are tapped and 
their own systems (e.g. air conditioning) cannot be used at the same 
time. Uninterruptable power supply units (UPS) turned out to be 
difficult to charge since local electricity supply was observed not stable/
powerful enough to charge them. Solar panels were used for the suitcase 
laboratory used by the Institut Pasteur de Dakar team in Guinea.
For future major operations some thought should be put into how 
to make sure generators run on the same fuel and how the international 
effort can oversee supply security. One possibility would be to tie in 
the international oil industry to help establish the supply chain. The 
fact that electrical engineers were in short supply to maintain electricity 
connections and repair damage it is seen as another point international 
umbrella support needs to fix for future outbreak deployments.
Internet 
The internet is an essential laboratory infrastructure feature these 
days to disseminate results but also to maintain modern laboratory 
devices (e.g. robotic platform systems) some of which are updated and 
even initiated through the internet. In the case of using the Minion 
sequencer it turned out that even data analysis (consensus calling) 
relied on an internet connection. Instability of internet connections or 
rigged Wi-Fi connections were experienced by most mobile laboratory 
teams and it was discussed if this could be solved by fieldable satellite 
connections e.g. VSAT systems which are of high quality but expensive. 
A lack of IT experts able to deal with the instabilities and the improvised 
rigged systems was also eminent and should be taken care of in the 
future.
Pre-analytical supply chain
The pre analytical supply chain was of great concern to most 
laboratories. The individual groups of people involved (sampling, 
packing, transport and delivery) were mostly not aware of what the 
receiving laboratory team or indeed the various parts of the supply 
chain actually needed and how they would proceed with the samples 
on receipt. Samples were brought by all means of transport by people 
dressed in full PPE with some PPE and without PPE. Some laboratory 
teams decided to simply trust the people transporting the samples 
despite their varying outfit who out of self-interest had to know what 
they were doing. 
The most difficult aspect of the supply chain was that uniform case 
ID forms were not available. Almost every laboratory team tried to 
solve the situation by using either case ID forms from the system the 
worked with in their parent institutions, translated version of these, or 
available forms of an internationally accepted organisation (CDC case 
ID form). Simply handing out copied forms resulted multiple identical 
barcodes from the original templates being assigned to several acute 
cases since staff at the ETC simply repeatedly copied them. Forms had 
to be handed out with stick on barcodes. The Dutch team for example 
used the CDC case ID form onto which they stuck their own barcodes.
Case ID forms were all too often delivered inside the “hot” sample 
pouch. Some were illegible; many were invariably soaked, bloody, or 
shredded due to being soaked inside the pouch. For that reason most 
laboratories created an entry portal or barrier to which the samples and 
their case ID forms had to be delivered and then safely processed before 
passing them on into the laboratory area.
 The Italian team copied the case ID forms on receipt by hand onto 
new forms, the German team copied them onto decontaminatable 
paper forms (pretex® 50.150), another team used a Smartphone case ID 
form, which was sent into the laboratory via Wi-Fi connection.
One lesson from all of these experiences is that a generally accepted 
international case ID form is necessary. Additionally there is the 
essential requirement for a single patient identifier to be able to track 
patient movements between health care and treatment centres. All of 
this should be considered by the WHO GOARN preparing for the next 
outbreak scenario.
Also future WHO emergency training packages for local support 
in the pre-analytical supply chain must convey an understanding of the 
supply chain to each chain link involved and to what happens to the 
sample at each chain link.
In a considerable number of cases transportation over long distances 
took very long and may have had an effect on sample processing and 
analytical results. Therefore the location of the mobile laboratory next 
to the ETC proved to be the best solution. It boosted communication 
and information exchange in some cases especially by joint meetings 
between the ETC and laboratory staff. It reduced sample delivery time 
but several concepts of transfer of the sample from hot to green zone 
were used. The Italian laboratory for example was connected to the 
hot zone through a window. The samples were left just outside of the 
windows after external decontamination by spraying with chlorine.
Data management
Laboratory information management systems (LIMS) were not 
available on site. Improvised systems included the exchange of results 
in csv files per emails via mobile phone or per SMS. These systems 
per se breached confidentiality. They were however still used due to 
the need to convey results. Particularly SMS messages were found 
to be error prone with the confusion of telephone numbers being a 
regularly occurring issue. The simple csv format was compatible to all 
sorts of computer operating systems. However the general opinion was 
that a mobile phone based app should be developed to allow secure 
transmission of results from sampling team to the laboratory and 
from the laboratory to HCW at the ETC. Developed concepts should 
however also allow easy data sharing with local government authorities 
while preserving confidentiality for the individual patients.
Analytical and clinical aspects of using molecular assays 
Analytical sensitivity
A major discussion point was the analytical sensitivity of the 
molecular detection assays used. Most laboratories treated real time 
Weidmann M (2016) Experiences of outbreak laboratory management in the Ebola Disease outbreak in West-Africa 2014-2015
Clin Microbiol Infect Dis, 2016         doi: 10.15761/CMID.1000S1008  Volume 1(4): 3-5
PCR (rtPCR) results with a CT> 35 as equivocal and repeated the test, 
or the extraction and the test, or tried an alternative test. It was generally 
agreed that in these cases a follow up test after 2 days was necessary. If 
a rise in virus titre (CT<35) then matched an evolving clinical picture 
this measure often helped to identify acute EVD cases. For the opposite 
outcome (CT> 35, or no CT) the clinical picture also had to match and 
indicate an end of EVD. However there was no standard approach in 
releasing formerly rtPCR positive, then negative patients. The detection 
of rising IgM was seen as a confirmation of beginning convalescence. 
In Guinea the following approach was under discussion at the 
time of the workshop: If a EVD patient shows no more symptoms 
for a couple of days a blood sample should be tested by rtPCR. If it is 
negative, blood of the patient should be retested after 48 hrs. If negative 
again, it would be deemed safe to release the patient.
The South-African team investigated the correlation between CT 
values and the presence of replicating EBOV. They found that it was 
possible to isolate EBOV from samples with a CT ≤ 30, but not from 
samples with a CT > 33. It appeared that there was a grey zone with 
sporadic isolations from samples with a CT 30-32. Comparing three 
real time PCR systems the range of RNA copies per millilitre that 
corresponded consistently to successful virus isolation was from 9.12 
x109 to 1.33 x105 copies/ml serum. Within the range of 1.31 x 105 to 2.42 
x 104 copies/ml, EBOV could not be isolated [2].
Internal positive controls
A variety of internal positive controls (IPC) were used in molecular 
assays. Molecular IPCs (RNA transcripts from plamids) were used 
as inhibition and efficiency controls and in general greater variation 
of IPC detection was observed in manual extractions than in robotic 
extraction. The use of negative pick up controls in extractions and test 
runs was also a common feature used. In general human housekeeping 
genes were not regarded as reliable as their expression level may vary 
greatly. During the outbreak however genetic detection of human 
material in swab samples e.g. by detection of the RNASE P gene was 
found to be helpful. In contras to the original protocol disseminated 
by the CDC, which allows for the detection of the RNASE P DNA, 
many operators would prefer mRNA detection as this also acts as 
RNA extraction control. It is quite clear that defined external quality 
assessment (EQA) panels are needed for the continued development of 
assays and that quality control of tests should include CT drifts of IPCs 
over time to avoid loss of IPC efficiency.
A major feature faced by some of the bigger teams was the 
turnaround of staff and the need for SOPs that could be handed 
over from one team to the next. Even if the SOP had evolved the 
documentation of that evolution is necessary to allow teams to take 
off from the quality level the assay has arrived at without the need 
to reiterate previous experiences made with the assays during the 
outbreak.
Procedural aspects
A discussion on turnaround time for real time PCR assays from 
receipt of sample to result pointed out that manual, semi-manual 
extraction and molecular amplification pipelines which were used in 
the various mobile laboratories were just as fast as the GeneExpert 
system all roughly needing on average 3hrs [2]. The GeneExpert system 
is simpler when it comes to the number of pipetting steps but overall 
does not offer much of an advantage over the existing pipelines used. 
Although the GeneExpert system is now being advocated as an 
easily adaptable system because it is already in widespread use through 
existing HIV and Tuberculosis programmes there is doubt whether 
this system would be flexible enough as it is for example currently not 
available for Bundibugiyo virus, and although announced it is not clear 
if and when an open platform of this device allowing free development 
of assays will be available.
It was also absolutely obvious that the term bed side test is 
completely misleading as staff at the ETC were so overwhelmed with 
their task of caring for the patients that there was simply no time nor 
scope to deal with bedside testing of samples. Bedside sampling was part 
of the routine and therefore the combination of mobile laboratories 
next to ETCs proved most efficient.
Clinical sensitivity
The experiences made in the EDV outbreak resulted in the 
following clear assessment of clinical parameters for molecular assays: 
Tests used in the EDV outbreak had a high positive predictive value 
(PPV) due to the sample population tested (Roughly 10% of those 
tested (case definition triage) were EBOV positive) and in most cases 
a sensitivity < 1. This meant that in the outbreak situation all positive 
tests were truly positive but that some positives may have been missed. 
Doctors were aware of the situation but comforted by the fact that only 
truly positive patients were admitted to the isolation wards. Positive 
cases missed in a first test were likely to be picked up in a follow up test 
if symptoms evolved.
Currently there are suggestions to increase the requirements for 
point of care robotic platforms to a high PPV and a sensitivity of 1. The 
consequences of this requirement apparently have not been properly 
thought through. A sensitivity of 1 raises the spectre of false positive 
patients being sent to the Ebola isolation ward where they are most 
likely to pick up the disease with all the consequences that would entail. 
This new requirement, if strictly adhered to, transforms a community-
based risk by missing some positives into an individual risk by allowing 
to submit not infected individuals to the isolation ward. In essence the 
current ETC structure would have to be overhauled to safeguard those 
false positive non infected patients, which means an infrastructure 
for individual care. This is regarded as a complicating factor for the 
infrastructure of ETCs. It would make them more difficult to build, 
organize and staff.
On the other side of the spectrum it was suggested to include some 
facilities for the patients awaiting dismissal subject to progressive 
negative testing as discussed above (e.g. football pitch).
In general it was strongly advised to link the characteristics of 
the individual molecular assay used to clinical data. Some mobile 
laboratories held weekly meetings with the clinical staff to discuss cases. 
This was seen as a very good measure to raise reciprocal appreciation 
of the expertise available. Upcoming training programmes for mobile 
laboratories and medical teams should include mutual training units 
for these very different teams and their different skill sets.
Laboratory procedures
Inactivation
The following approaches for inactivation during RNA extraction 
were used: AVL-Buffer (lysis buffer containing guanidin thiocynate, 
Qiagen, Hilden, Germany) + ethanol [3,4], AVL-Buffer + 60°C/15min 
[5,6], AVL-Buffer + 1% Triton-X-100 [7], SpeedXtract Suspension 
A (Qiagen, Hilden, Germany) + 95°C/10min [8]. All were shown to 
inactivate EBOV in patient samples.
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A possibility to prepare inactivation tubes containing a 
commercially available inactivation buffer which can be easily prepared 
and used during sampling, was presented during the meeting and has 
been published in the meantime [9].
Most teams used the following inactivation protocols for serological 
samples: thermal inactivation at 60°C/15min/30 min [5] or chemical 
inactivation with 0.1 % Triton-X-100 for 15-20 min [7,10] or chemical 
inactivation with 4% paraformaldehyde [4].
A major concern was expressed for samples for clinical chemistry. 
First of all many different types of tubes are used for different 
analysis systems. To many it was unclear how these samples could be 
inactivated. Out of caution clinical chemistry devices were therefore 
used in glovebox systems. However the Piccolo Xpress Chemistry 
Analyser and i-Stat systems used suffered from the corrosive nature 
of the decontaminants used (bleach) in the hot zone, and required 
ambient temperature (air conditioning obligatory). Some of the devices 
were not suitable for use under negative pressure. A new inactivation 
protocol for samples for clinical chemistry testing has described the use 
of 0.1% Triton-X-100/60min [11].
Gloveboxes
A variety of gloveboxes was used by the various teams. There are 
no internationally accepted standards for larger fixed (stationary in 
lab tent) or smaller mobile (flexible pop-up plastic or hardplastic) 
gloveboxes. Most of them used negative pressure but one mobile 
hardplastic box did not. Specifications should be developed and agree 
on the negative pressure value to be obtained, the types of filters to be 
used and on filter exchange intervals. It was suggested to use blower 
testing to assess negative pressure and integrity of gloves. This however 
needs some consideration as the complexities of the maintenance 
requirements of a BSL 3/4 laboratory should not be transferred 
directly to field laboratories, and guidance on glovebox maintenance as 
published by Health and Safety Executive in the United Kingdom can 
only be a starting point for this discussion [12]. A safe but pragmatic 
approach is needed. Many operators found that using a laboratory 
glove on top of the fixed glove improved dexterity.
Decontamination
In comparing decontamination protocols it emerged that mostly 
0.5% bleach was used for daily cleaning (0.1% used by some in inside 
the laboratory) and external sample container decontamination, 0.05-
0.1% bleach for glove or hand washing, 1% bleach inside the glovebox 
and 5% for glovebox decontamination.
The French team in Macenta, used peracetic acid to sterilize the 
class III safety cabinet once a day (after prior inactivation of waste 
with 0.5% bleach). After external decontamination with 0.5% bleach, 
the Piccolo and i-STAT instruments and the centrifuge were placed 
into hermetic bags to avoid entering in contact with the peracetic acid 
during the sterilization procedure.
The Institute Pasteur de Dakar used Incidin 1%. This disinfectant 
is accredited for use in French speaking countries of West-Africa and 
is not corrosive. It should be regarded as an alternative to the use of 
bleach as respiratory irritation was reported from quite a few of the 
international staff members that worked in the mobile laboratories 
[13]. It could also ameliorate the corrosion problems which some 
laboratory gear suffered.
Post-epidemic needs
An extensive collection of EVD patient samples was made during 
the outbreak at several sites. The UK and Italy have arranged for 
contracts with the government of Sierra Leone to allow for regulated 
transfer to and use of the samples in European laboratories. These 
exemplary contracts should be evaluated to draft template contracts for 
future outbreaks. Contracts were not used in all cases and some sample 
collections were transferred without formal agreements. Everybody 
present however agreed that formal agreements should be the rule to 
avoid individual research teams or consortia deciding on samples and 
to make them available to the scientific community.
Research needs to be addressed were discussed and this 
shortlist of topics should be put on the research agenda by 
funding agencies
1. Correlation of molecular testing results with clinical symptoms 
and progression of the disease
2. Determination of the suitability of detection assays for the 
various sample types (Blood, urine, swabs)
3. Determination of residual infectivity in low titre samples after 
resolution of the disease
4. Research on mother-child transmission and transmission to 
HCW during emergency cesarian section.
5. There is an urgent need to fund research into differential 
diagnostics for viral haemorrhagic fevers
6. Concepts to improve training of local staff assisting in sampling 
and transportation of samples
7. Preparation for future outbreak emergencies with special 
attention to supply logistics in regard to custom clearances, 
cold chain supply , fuel supply, mobile internet supply.
8. Development of a safe easy to use mobile phone LIMS app for 
use in emergency situations in infrastructure poor settings.
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